Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations

Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations

This project investigates the association among ownership structure and firm performance of Palestinian’s listed companies. The data collected for this research is for the period 2003-2007 and the sample consists of 37 companies. Five specific research questions are applied to investigate the associ...

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Main Author: Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
Published: 2009
Subjects:
HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
Online Access:https://etd.uum.edu.my/3662/1/s800248.pdf
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id my-uum-etd.3662
record_format uketd_dc
institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
collection UUM ETD
language eng
advisor Abidin, Shamharir
topic HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
spellingShingle HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq
Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
description This project investigates the association among ownership structure and firm performance of Palestinian’s listed companies. The data collected for this research is for the period 2003-2007 and the sample consists of 37 companies. Five specific research questions are applied to investigate the associations among the vote fraction held by controlling shareholder/shareholders and performance and vote differentiation and performance. The performance procedures employed are stock return, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. The outcome specify that corporations with a dispersed ownership structure, (i.e. the largest shareholder holds less than 20% of total votes), are connected with worse performance concerning stock return, ROA and ROE, but are greatly valued relating to Tobin’s Q. This research points out that the association among vote concentration and performance might be spurious. When reflect on firm specific factors, and categorizations of the controlling shareholder appear to engage in recreation vital role. Further this research demonstrates that the associations among vote concentration and performance vanish, when consider other vote shareholders exceeding different thresholds (5, 10 and 20%). In line with previous research, the present study finds that vote differentiation does not affect firm performance. Instead risk and size of the company are decisive in the extent to which companies apply vote differentiation tools.
format Thesis
qualification_name masters
qualification_level Master's degree
author Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq
author_facet Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq
author_sort Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq
title Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
title_short Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
title_full Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
title_fullStr Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
title_full_unstemmed Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations
title_sort ownership structure and firms performance : a case study in palestinian listed corporations
granting_institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
granting_department College of Business (COB)
publishDate 2009
url https://etd.uum.edu.my/3662/1/s800248.pdf
_version_ 1747827621026070528
spelling my-uum-etd.36622013-12-08T09:48:42Z Ownership Structure and Firms Performance : A Case Study in Palestinian Listed Corporations 2009 Hajjaj, Mohammed Abdul Alkareem Rezeq Abidin, Shamharir College of Business (COB) College of Business HD2709-2930.7 Corporations This project investigates the association among ownership structure and firm performance of Palestinian’s listed companies. The data collected for this research is for the period 2003-2007 and the sample consists of 37 companies. Five specific research questions are applied to investigate the associations among the vote fraction held by controlling shareholder/shareholders and performance and vote differentiation and performance. The performance procedures employed are stock return, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. The outcome specify that corporations with a dispersed ownership structure, (i.e. the largest shareholder holds less than 20% of total votes), are connected with worse performance concerning stock return, ROA and ROE, but are greatly valued relating to Tobin’s Q. This research points out that the association among vote concentration and performance might be spurious. When reflect on firm specific factors, and categorizations of the controlling shareholder appear to engage in recreation vital role. Further this research demonstrates that the associations among vote concentration and performance vanish, when consider other vote shareholders exceeding different thresholds (5, 10 and 20%). In line with previous research, the present study finds that vote differentiation does not affect firm performance. Instead risk and size of the company are decisive in the extent to which companies apply vote differentiation tools. 2009 Thesis https://etd.uum.edu.my/3662/ https://etd.uum.edu.my/3662/1/s800248.pdf text eng validuser http://lintas.uum.edu.my:8080/elmu/index.jsp?module=webopac-l&action=fullDisplayRetriever.jsp&szMaterialNo=0000337163 masters masters Universiti Utara Malaysia Articles/Journals Agrawal, Anup and Nandu J. Nagarajan (1990) “Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms.” Journal of Finance 45(4): 1325-31. Cho, M. 1998. Ownership Structure, Investment, and The Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 47(1): 103-121. Claessens S, Djankov S and Lang LHP (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 81-112. 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Damodaran, A., (2002), “Investment valuation- tools and techniques for determining the value of any asset”, 2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons Inc. Hill, C., Griffiths, W., and Judge, G., (2001), “Undergraduate econometrics”, 2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., USA Peterson, S., (1998), “Essays on large shareholders and corporate control”,

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