Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies

Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the presence of independent directors on boards of directors. Based on the agency theory, we study the different factors influencing the nomination of independent directors. The tests were applied to a sample of 71 companies belonging to Burs...

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Main Author: Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
eng
Published: 2014
Subjects:
HF5601-5689 Accounting
Online Access:https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/1/s812371.pdf
https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/2/s812371_abstract.pdf
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institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
collection UUM ETD
language eng
eng
advisor Ahmad, Norafifah
topic HF5601-5689 Accounting
spellingShingle HF5601-5689 Accounting
Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed
Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
description The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the presence of independent directors on boards of directors. Based on the agency theory, we study the different factors influencing the nomination of independent directors. The tests were applied to a sample of 71 companies belonging to Bursa Malaysia Main Market from 2007 to 2009. Using an OLS data regression framework, the findings show that the, coalition control, leverage and CEO tenure determine the independence of the board from the management. The result indicated that when the part of capital represented on the board and held by the coalition of control is low, the presence of independent directors is more important. The presence of the independent directors is significantly and positively determined by the level of debt and CEO tenure. However, we do not find evidence of the influence of the ownership structure, Company size and CEO Duality.
format Thesis
qualification_name masters
qualification_level Master's degree
author Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed
author_facet Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed
author_sort Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed
title Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
title_short Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
title_full Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
title_fullStr Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
title_full_unstemmed Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies
title_sort factors that determine independent director's existence on the board of directors: evidence from malaysian listed companies
granting_institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
granting_department Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business
publishDate 2014
url https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/1/s812371.pdf
https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/2/s812371_abstract.pdf
_version_ 1776103628730269696
spelling my-uum-etd.40392023-01-18T08:40:24Z Factors That Determine Independent Director's Existence on the Board of Directors: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Companies 2014-07 Abdi, Mubarik Mohamed Ahmad, Norafifah Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business HF5601-5689 Accounting The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the presence of independent directors on boards of directors. Based on the agency theory, we study the different factors influencing the nomination of independent directors. The tests were applied to a sample of 71 companies belonging to Bursa Malaysia Main Market from 2007 to 2009. Using an OLS data regression framework, the findings show that the, coalition control, leverage and CEO tenure determine the independence of the board from the management. The result indicated that when the part of capital represented on the board and held by the coalition of control is low, the presence of independent directors is more important. The presence of the independent directors is significantly and positively determined by the level of debt and CEO tenure. However, we do not find evidence of the influence of the ownership structure, Company size and CEO Duality. 2014-07 Thesis https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/ https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/1/s812371.pdf text eng public https://etd.uum.edu.my/4039/2/s812371_abstract.pdf text eng public masters masters Universiti Utara Malaysia Abdul Rahman and Abdul Haniffa (2005). The effect of role of duality on corporate performance in Malaysia. Corporate ownership and control, 2 (2), 40-47. Abdullah, S. A. (2004) Accrual management and the independence of the board of directors and audit committees. IIUM journal of Economics and Management, 12 (1), 49-80. Agrawal, A. (1996). 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