Car plate tendering in Malaysia

This is the first empirical research examining the determinants of car plate winning price. Detailed car plate auctioning information such as bidder demographic profile (age, race and gender) and bid price and bid premium are obtained from the Road Transport Department of Malaysia (RTD or JPJ) for t...

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Main Author:	Zhou, Yao
Format:	Thesis
Language:	eng eng
Published:	2014
Subjects:	HF5001-6182 Business
Online Access:	https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/1/s815648.pdf https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/2/s815648_abstract.pdf
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id	my-uum-etd.4642
record_format	uketd_dc
institution	Universiti Utara Malaysia
collection	UUM ETD
language	eng eng
advisor	Wong, Woei Chyuan
topic	HF5001-6182 Business
spellingShingle	HF5001-6182 Business Zhou, Yao Car plate tendering in Malaysia
description	This is the first empirical research examining the determinants of car plate winning price. Detailed car plate auctioning information such as bidder demographic profile (age, race and gender) and bid price and bid premium are obtained from the Road Transport Department of Malaysia (RTD or JPJ) for the state of Kedah during 2011 to 2013. Capitalizing on this proprietary dataset, I attempt to quantify bidders’ willingness to pay for superstition believes and visual appealing numbers. Car plate numbers offer a good laboratory test to consumers’ willingness to pay since car plate numbers have no intrinsic value. More so in Malaysia where there is no secondary market for car plate where plate numbers are not transferable. I find support for superstition hypothesis where an addition of number “8”to a plate is associated with 9.4% premium in winning bid price while an addition of number “4” to a plate reduces the bid price by 10.4%. Chinese community perceives number “8” as lucky number because it rhymes similarly to the word “prosper” or “prosperity”. “4” is bad for it rhymes similarly to the word “die” or “death”. I also find support for visual appealing hypothesis where visually appealing plates are sold at the significant premium as compared to other plates. For example, single and double digits car plates are 181% and 42.4% more expensive than a non-single digit car plate
format	Thesis
qualification_name	masters
qualification_level	Master's degree
author	Zhou, Yao
author_facet	Zhou, Yao
author_sort	Zhou, Yao
title	Car plate tendering in Malaysia
title_short	Car plate tendering in Malaysia
title_full	Car plate tendering in Malaysia
title_fullStr	Car plate tendering in Malaysia
title_full_unstemmed	Car plate tendering in Malaysia
title_sort	car plate tendering in malaysia
granting_institution	Universiti Utara Malaysia
granting_department	Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business
publishDate	2014
url	https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/1/s815648.pdf https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/2/s815648_abstract.pdf
_version_	1747827771729510400
spelling	my-uum-etd.46422022-06-09T01:02:09Z Car plate tendering in Malaysia 2014 Zhou, Yao Wong, Woei Chyuan Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business HF5001-6182 Business This is the first empirical research examining the determinants of car plate winning price. Detailed car plate auctioning information such as bidder demographic profile (age, race and gender) and bid price and bid premium are obtained from the Road Transport Department of Malaysia (RTD or JPJ) for the state of Kedah during 2011 to 2013. Capitalizing on this proprietary dataset, I attempt to quantify bidders’ willingness to pay for superstition believes and visual appealing numbers. Car plate numbers offer a good laboratory test to consumers’ willingness to pay since car plate numbers have no intrinsic value. More so in Malaysia where there is no secondary market for car plate where plate numbers are not transferable. I find support for superstition hypothesis where an addition of number “8”to a plate is associated with 9.4% premium in winning bid price while an addition of number “4” to a plate reduces the bid price by 10.4%. Chinese community perceives number “8” as lucky number because it rhymes similarly to the word “prosper” or “prosperity”. “4” is bad for it rhymes similarly to the word “die” or “death”. I also find support for visual appealing hypothesis where visually appealing plates are sold at the significant premium as compared to other plates. For example, single and double digits car plates are 181% and 42.4% more expensive than a non-single digit car plate 2014 Thesis https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/ https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/1/s815648.pdf text eng public https://etd.uum.edu.my/4642/2/s815648_abstract.pdf text eng public masters masters Universiti Utara Malaysia Abbott, K.,R, & Sherratt, T.,N,.(2011). The evolution of superstition through optimal use of incomplete information. 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Car plate tendering in Malaysia

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