The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies

The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies

This thesis investigates some of corporate governance practices in Malaysian public listed companies with a particular interest in selected government linked corporation (GLCs), participating under the government transformation programme (GTP). Thus, this study uses board characteristics, governmen...

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Main Author: Siti Khadijah, Saleh
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
eng
Published: 2017
Subjects:
HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
Online Access:https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/1/s818578_01.pdf
https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/2/s818578_02.pdf
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id my-uum-etd.7549
record_format uketd_dc
institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
collection UUM ETD
language eng
eng
advisor Kadir @ Shahar, Hanita
topic HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
spellingShingle HD2709-2930.7 Corporations
Siti Khadijah, Saleh
The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
description This thesis investigates some of corporate governance practices in Malaysian public listed companies with a particular interest in selected government linked corporation (GLCs), participating under the government transformation programme (GTP). Thus, this study uses board characteristics, government ownership and performance as independent variables that affect directors’ remuneration. The board characteristics consists of board size, proportional of independent director, proportional independent director in remuneration and audit committee and CEO tenure. The control variables used are firm size, leverage and growth in this study. The study explains the relationship between director remuneration and corporate governance structures in a distinguished setting when the government has some influence in corporate decision making. There are 20 GLCs (known as G20s) selected under implementation of government transformation programmes starting from 2004. The study is conducted based on balanced data under observation for 6 years (2010-2015). However, due to sample selection criteria, there are only fifteen companies left for selection in this study. The agency theory and steward theory are used in this study to determine whether there is an implication in the corporate governance issues towards directors’ remuneration. Using pooled OLS and Panel data regression techniques, it is found that board characteristics – independent directors and board meeting are negatively significant to the directors’ remuneration. However, the government ownership and performance is not significant. Thus, the steward theory is rejected due to difference in political and policy applied by sample companies. Moreover, firm size, growth and leverage show significant positively relationship to the director remuneration. Finally, the agency theory is more relevant in explaining the corporate governance issues to determined director remuneration in Malaysia.
format Thesis
qualification_name masters
qualification_level Master's degree
author Siti Khadijah, Saleh
author_facet Siti Khadijah, Saleh
author_sort Siti Khadijah, Saleh
title The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
title_short The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
title_full The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
title_fullStr The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
title_full_unstemmed The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
title_sort impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies
granting_institution Universiti Utara Malaysia
granting_department School of Economics, Finance & Banking
publishDate 2017
url https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/1/s818578_01.pdf
https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/2/s818578_02.pdf
_version_ 1747828232244166656
spelling my-uum-etd.75492021-08-18T07:31:29Z The impact of board structure and government ownership on director remuneration: empirical evidence of government linked companies 2017 Siti Khadijah, Saleh Kadir @ Shahar, Hanita School of Economics, Finance & Banking School of Economics, Finance & Banking HD2709-2930.7 Corporations This thesis investigates some of corporate governance practices in Malaysian public listed companies with a particular interest in selected government linked corporation (GLCs), participating under the government transformation programme (GTP). Thus, this study uses board characteristics, government ownership and performance as independent variables that affect directors’ remuneration. The board characteristics consists of board size, proportional of independent director, proportional independent director in remuneration and audit committee and CEO tenure. The control variables used are firm size, leverage and growth in this study. The study explains the relationship between director remuneration and corporate governance structures in a distinguished setting when the government has some influence in corporate decision making. There are 20 GLCs (known as G20s) selected under implementation of government transformation programmes starting from 2004. The study is conducted based on balanced data under observation for 6 years (2010-2015). However, due to sample selection criteria, there are only fifteen companies left for selection in this study. The agency theory and steward theory are used in this study to determine whether there is an implication in the corporate governance issues towards directors’ remuneration. Using pooled OLS and Panel data regression techniques, it is found that board characteristics – independent directors and board meeting are negatively significant to the directors’ remuneration. However, the government ownership and performance is not significant. Thus, the steward theory is rejected due to difference in political and policy applied by sample companies. Moreover, firm size, growth and leverage show significant positively relationship to the director remuneration. Finally, the agency theory is more relevant in explaining the corporate governance issues to determined director remuneration in Malaysia. 2017 Thesis https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/ https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/1/s818578_01.pdf text eng public https://etd.uum.edu.my/7549/2/s818578_02.pdf text eng public masters masters Universiti Utara Malaysia Abdullah, S. N. (2006). Directors’ remuneration, firm’s performance and corporate governance in Malaysia among distressed companies. Corporate Governance, 6(2), 162–174. Abed, S., Suwaidan, M., & Slimani, S. (2014a). The Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation in Jordanian Industrial Corporations. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(12), 110–118. Abidin, Z. Z. (2009). 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