Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance variables on emerging financially distress companies in Malaysia. This study has selected the sample from listed companies of Main and ACE market using classification of Practice Note 4 (PN4) or Practice Note 17 (PN17) a...

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Main Author:	Barameswary, Duriraj
Format:	Thesis
Language:	eng eng
Published:	2018
Subjects:	HG Finance
Online Access:	https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/1/s818099_01.pdf https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/2/s818099_02.pdf
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id	my-uum-etd.7817
record_format	uketd_dc
institution	Universiti Utara Malaysia
collection	UUM ETD
language	eng eng
advisor	Ahmad, Abd. Halim @ Hamilton
topic	HG Finance
spellingShingle	HG Finance Barameswary, Duriraj Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
description	The main objective of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance variables on emerging financially distress companies in Malaysia. This study has selected the sample from listed companies of Main and ACE market using classification of Practice Note 4 (PN4) or Practice Note 17 (PN17) and Guidance Note (GN3) respectively in Bursa Malaysia. This study also attempted to highlight the theories of corporate governance that closely related to the Malaysian listed firms. The period of study is 13 years (2001 - 2013). Logistic regressions have been conducted and three models have developed to test the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The findings show that blockholders ownership and number of blockholders have an impact on emerging financially distressed companies. This analysis method can be applicable for those companies currently facing financial distress situation. Meanwhile, board size shows no significant relationship on emerging financially distressed companies as this shows that board size doesn’t give an impact on emerging financially distressed companies.
format	Thesis
qualification_name	masters
qualification_level	Master's degree
author	Barameswary, Duriraj
author_facet	Barameswary, Duriraj
author_sort	Barameswary, Duriraj
title	Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
title_short	Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
title_full	Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
title_fullStr	Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
title_full_unstemmed	Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
title_sort	emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance
granting_institution	Universiti Utara Malaysia
granting_department	Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business
publishDate	2018
url	https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/1/s818099_01.pdf https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/2/s818099_02.pdf
_version_	1747828270114537472
spelling	my-uum-etd.78172021-08-09T06:08:32Z Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance 2018 Barameswary, Duriraj Ahmad, Abd. Halim @ Hamilton Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business HG Finance The main objective of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance variables on emerging financially distress companies in Malaysia. This study has selected the sample from listed companies of Main and ACE market using classification of Practice Note 4 (PN4) or Practice Note 17 (PN17) and Guidance Note (GN3) respectively in Bursa Malaysia. This study also attempted to highlight the theories of corporate governance that closely related to the Malaysian listed firms. The period of study is 13 years (2001 - 2013). Logistic regressions have been conducted and three models have developed to test the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The findings show that blockholders ownership and number of blockholders have an impact on emerging financially distressed companies. This analysis method can be applicable for those companies currently facing financial distress situation. Meanwhile, board size shows no significant relationship on emerging financially distressed companies as this shows that board size doesn’t give an impact on emerging financially distressed companies. 2018 Thesis https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/ https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/1/s818099_01.pdf text eng public https://etd.uum.edu.my/7817/2/s818099_02.pdf text eng public https://sierra.uum.edu.my/record=b1699333~S1 masters masters Universiti Utara Malaysia Abdullah, S. N. (2006). Board structure and ownership in Malaysia: The case of distressed listed companies. Corporate Governance, 582-594. Abeysekera, I. (2010). The influence of board size on intellectual capital disclosure by Kenyan listed. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 11(4), 504-518. Abidin, N. 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Emerging from financial distress status : the role of corporate governance

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